We synthesize the positive interest-alignment hypothesis proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) , the reduced-control hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) , and the informativeness hypothesis proposed by Fan and Wong (2002) shareholder is negatively corrected with the comparable price multiples. The relationship between corporate governance and the initial return is less significant in that the prediction from the interest-alignment argument and that from the reduced-monitoring hypothesis is contradictory when the controlling shareholder invests high cash flow rights. The informativeness hypothesis receives mixed support in that the result from the information content of the ownership structure is identical to that from the interest-alignment hypothesis, while the result from the accessibility of information is less supported.
Introduction
The initial public offering (IPO hereafter) is a key event in separating ownership form control that necessitates careful consideration of how to mitigate owner/manager agency conflict (Engel et al., 2001) . Among the investigated issues, underpricing of an IPO is the most extensively documented across many economic entities. Early theories emphasize asymmetric information among corporate insiders, investors, and investment bankers 1 . For example, better quality issuers undervalue issuing shares to deter lower quality issuers from mimicking. These issuers recoup their sacrifice from future issuing activities (Welch, 1989) , favorable market response (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989) , or more analyst coverage (Chemmanur, 1993) . However, if issuers were less informative of the market demands for shares, they could underprice shares as to reduce marketing expenditure (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001) , mitigate possible legal liability (Tinic, 1988; Hughes and Thakor, 1992) , and increase aftermarket liquidity (Boehmer and Fishe, 2001 ).
Several recent papers shift the discussion to ownership structure rather than asymmetric information. For example, Booth and Chua (1996) indicate that in order to enhance liquidity of issuing shares and lower the cost of capital; the issuing firms ration underpriced shares to a larger shareholder base which results in a dispersed ownership structure. From a different perspective, Brennan and Franks (1997) propose a reduced monitoring hypothesis that insiders generate excess demand of issuing shares through underpricing as to ward off large bidders and external monitoring. The reduced monitoring hypothesis is further investigated and receives partial supports (see Field and Sheehan, 2000; Smart and Zutter, 2003) .
In this study we contribute to the literature by illustrating that corporate governance plays a vital role in dictating the comparable price multiples 2 and the initial return of an IPO. Corporate governance is especially important for IPO firms not only because it depicts a company's superstructure that affects resources allocation but also because it contains manifest variables that reveal controlling shareholder's motivation of having the firm run properly or his/her ambition of exploiting wealth from minority shareholders. We argue that the price multiples of
IPOs are settled through negotiations between issuing firms and underwriters.
According to the interest-alignment hypothesis proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) and Claessens et al. (2000) , the controlling shareholders with high cash flow rights are desperate to anchor a high offering price as to minimize their sacrifice in the IPO progression. High offering price is also acceptable to underwriters who believe that the controlling shareholders will have the firm run properly for their own sake and deem their accounting data to be informative.
In contrast, when entrenching controlling shareholders having voting rights far exceeding their cash-flow rights, the underwriters on behalf of outside investors worry about the possibility of wealth exploitation by the controlling shareholders. These misconducts are observable but unverifiable ex post, therefore underwriters assuming all the underwriting risk are reluctant to spare a high offer price. These controlling shareholders are not as insistent as when they have high cash-flow rights in that they only have to bear a small portion of underpricing costs.
The reduced monitoring hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) complements the explanations from corporate governance. The hypothesis indicates that insiders valuing independence ward off external monitoring through underpricing the new issuing shares as to generate excess demand, permitting discriminatory rationing against large bidders. However, the case is less significant in Taiwanese IPO since the controlling shareholders, either with high cash flow rights or with low cash flow rights but leveling control through pyramidal ownership or cross shareholding, are less likely to underprice shares since their control is well-entrenched right before
IPOs. Consequently, the prediction of the relationship between comparable price multiples and cash flow rights is positive both for the interest-alignment hypothesis and for the reduced monitoring hypothesis. However, we surmise that the controlling shareholder in a divergent control-cash relation is relatively passive in setting the offer price multiples since he/she has only bear a small portion of underpricing cost even though it is unnecessary for him/her of so doing. The underwriter facing a divergent control-cash structure is a hardliner and is reluctant to permit a high offer price. Therefore, we would predict an insignificant or mildly negative relation between offer price and the control-cash deviation. Our empirical findings verify the aforementioned predictions.
As the offer price results from repetitive negotiations between issuing firms and underwriters, the initial returns are further intervened by outside investors who take into considerations of the soundness of corporate governance of issuing firms and the reputation of accompanying underwriters. The interest-alignment argument predicts a positive relation between controlling shareholder's cash flow rights and initial returns.
In contrast, a deviating voting-cash structure emitting a negative signal to investors that the controlling shareholder might engage in wealth exploitation, which results in an impotent demand of the issuing shares and therefore lower initial returns.
We surmise the involvement of outside investors in the price negotiating game would blur the relations predicted by the aforementioned hypotheses. Even though ownership structure is still the most important discerning variable, outside investors, partly consisting of noise traders and partly inaccessible to the information regarding the corporate governance or issuing firm, are less responsive to corporate governance valuables. The empirical results illustrate a less significant relation between corporate governance and initial returns.
The informativeness hypothesis proposed by Fan and Wong 3 (2002) mainly echoes the prediction of the interest-alignment hypothesis that firms with sound corporate governance structure are accompanied with higher comparable price multiples and higher initial returns since their provided accounting data is perceived to be more informative. There is only one minor point of the informativeness hypothesis that implies that the explicit variable of corporate governance, such as the proportion of directors and supervisors represented by the controlling shareholder 4 , is more easily accessible and thus has more predictive power than the implicit variables, such as the controlling shareholder's cash flow rights and his/her deviation of voting from cash flow rights. However, the empirical results lend little lenity to the above argument.
In this study we synthesize the interest-alignment hypothesis, the reduced monitoring hypotheses, and the informativeness hypothesis. Some of them are 3 They indicate that the reported earnings for firms with concentrated ownership are perceived low informative because they are prepared for serving the controlling shareholders' self-interested purposes. Even without agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors, concentrated ownership preventing leakage of proprietary knowledge also leads to low informativeness of the reported data. Consequently, underwriters have an inclination to discount its value and establish a lower offer price. 4 Fama and Jensen (1983) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) propose the appointment of outside directors results in a significant increase in firm value. From a different perspective, a high proportion of board membership in the hands of controlling shareholder is negatively associated the firm's value.
consistent in predicting the relations between corporate governance and the offering price and therefore initial returns of an IPO firm, while some are not. Our empirical findings support most of the predictions. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 introduces. Section 2 develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and methodology. Section 4 reports the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes.
Development of Hypothesis
In this section we develop hypotheses that relate the governance structure of an IPO firm to the offer price and therefore the following initial return. There are three hypotheses pillar our arguments: the interest-alignment hypothesis proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) and Calessens et al. (2002) , the reduced monitoring hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) , and the informativeness hypothesis proposed by Fan and Wong (2002) .
Cash Flow Rights and Offer Price
La Porta et al. (1999) portray that most firms around the world are predominantly controlled by a single large shareholder. La Porta et al. (2002) indicate that higher cash flow rights could serve as a firm commitment for the controlling shareholder not expropriating minority wealth in countries with inferior shareholder protection. Claessens et al. (2002) find that firm value increases with the cash flow ownership of the largest shareholder, consistent with a positive incentive effect. But firm value falls when the voting rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash flow ownersip, consistent with an entrenchment effect.
The controlling shareholders with higher cash flow rights are strongly motivated to negotiate a high offering price with underwriters in that they have to bear much of underpricing costs from IPOs. The corresponding underwriters are also willing to compromise the price setting since the concentrated ownership serves as a credible commitment for not expropriating minority shareholders (Gomes, 2000) . The commitment is credible since minority shareholders can discipline the controlling shareholder by discounting the stock price at least to an extent equivalent to the portion extracted by the controlling shareholder. The incentive alignment effect predicts that an increase of controlling shareholder ownership beyond the minimum level needed for effective control improve the alignment of interests between controlling shareholder and minority shareholders. Brennan and Franks (1997) develop the reduced monitoring hypothesis illustrating that insiders valuing independence are willing to underprice new issues to generate excess demand, permitting discriminatory rationing against large bidders.
However, this argument is less than an issue for the controlling shareholders with higher cash flow rights. With entrenched control in the first place, the controlling shareholders are reluctant to devalue the new issuing shares simply for the purpose of preventing the block size of new shareholdings. Moreover, Field and Sheehan (2000) report that a large fraction of going-public firms have blockholders in place prior to the IPO, so if managers use underpricing to prevent blocks from forming, they would have already lost the battle in the first place. The outcome of a price-haggling forum composing of strong-will controlling shareholders and passive underwriters would obliquely direct to higher comparable firm multiples. 
Cash Flow Rights and Initial Return
Initial return is referred to the price difference between the price of first trading day and the offer price. Up to the status quo, outside investors are invited into the negotiating game through which the offer price was previously settled by the issuing firm and underwriter. These outside investors would prefer to purchase the issuing shares in which the controlling shareholders having higher cash flow rights are more likely to pay due diligence and have the company run properly for their own sake.
High cash flow rights also serve as a credible commitment since the outside investors could also discipline ill-intended controlling shareholders through discounting the stock price. In case of purchase fanatic out brought by outside investors, the initial returns are expected to be higher. In contrast, the reduced monitoring hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) predicts that the initial returns are expected to be higher only when the control-entrenching insider's pursuit of dispersed ownership structure through underpricing shares. They find support of this hypothesis by identifying a negative correlation between firs-day returns and subsequent blockholder ownership in a sample of United Kingdom IPOs. Field and Sheehan (200) also find a negative correlation between underpricing and post-IPO ownership concentration. However, they emphasize that the sign of relationship depends on the type of outside shareholder rather than the size of blockholding per se. Smart and Zutter (2003) find that as compared to single-class firms, the dual-class firms with voting control secured lack the incentive to underprice to prevent from the formation of blockholing.
However, firms choosing dual-class issuance are not without cost. They trade lower valuations relative to fundamentals and face higher burden of proof through using higher quality underwriters when first accessing equity markets.
In the cases of Taiwanese IPOs, the controlling shareholders having high cash flow rights right before IPOs are well-entrenched in control and are less likely to underprice shares for the purpose of creating posterior buying cascade. Therefore, the initial returns are expected to be lower. 
Control-Cash Deviation and Offer Price
The agency problem stemming from concentrated ownership focuses on the conflicts between the controlling owner and minority shareholders. Grossman and Hart (1988) and Harris and Raviv (1988) show that separating ownership and control can lower shareholders' value and may not be socially optimal. Shelifer and Vishny (1997) illustrate that as ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control as to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders. Claessens et al (2002) show that for the largest shareholders the difference between control rights and cash flow rights is associated with a value discount and that the discount generally increases with the size of the wedge between control rights and cash flow rights. With a deviating control-cash structure, the controlling owners are strongly motivated to opportunistically deprive minority shareholders of their rights through self-dealing transactions in which profits are transferred to other companies he/she controls, and the pursuit of not profit-maximizing objectives in return for personal utilities. With the increasing managerial ownership, the entrenching owner is less subject to governance of boards of directors and to discipline by market for corporate control.
Under a divergent control-cash ownership structure, the controlling shareholders would not be as insistent as when they invest high degree of cash flow rights to ask a high issuing price in that they would have only to bear a small portion of underpricing costs. Meanwhile, the corresponding underwriter bearing the risk of unfavorable market response upon the issuing shares would dominate the price setting and is reluctant to allow a high offering price. One of the underlying reasons is that the informativeness of the firm's reporting is less credible because it reflects more of the controlling owner's self interest rather than the firm's true economic condition, needless to say when the controlling owner manipulate earnings for outright expropriation. The unsounded governance structure from divergent control-cash relationship predicts lower comparable price multiples for the issuing shares.
From the perspective of reduced monitoring hypothesis, the controlling shareholder with entrenched controlling power prior to IPO is relatively passive to the price setting. Even though the entrenched controlling shareholders do not have to underpirce shares as to prevent the emergence of new blockholdings, it is possible for him/her to make concession on price setting since only a small portion of underpricing costs would incur to him/her.
Under a deviating control-cash structure, hard-lining underwriters vis-à-vis passive controlling shareholders would negotiate lower price multiples. Therefore, we hypothesize negative relationship between deviating ownership structure and comparable firm multiples.
Hypothesis 3: The comparable price multiples of IPO firms are negatively correlated
with the divergence between the controlling shareholder's degree of cash flow rights and voting rights.
Control-Cash Deviation and Initial Return
Rational investors are less likely to have a strong demand upon the shares of issuing firms with a deviating control-cash structure. From the perspective of corporate governance, the initial returns of these new issued shares will be negatively correlated with the deviation of the controlling shareholder's control and cash flow rights.
From the perspective of reduced monitoring argument, only when management confronting potential challenge from outside blockholders would like to generate excess demand and ownership dispersion through underpricing. The controlling shareholder in a deviating control-cash structure is well entrenched either through cross shareholding or pyramidal ownership arrangement. He/she is less willing to underprice issuing shares right from the beginning. The issuing shares are thus less likely to create a buying cascade.
The unsoundness of corporate governance intimidates rational investors from buying the issuing shares. And the unattractive offering price reduces individual investor's sentiment toward buying the issuing shares of a divergent control-cash company. Therefore, we would expect negative association between control-cash divergence and initial return. 
Data and Methodology

The Data
The sample consists of the firms that were first publicly listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from 1992 through 2001 of which the required information for calculating ownership structure and board composition is available. We exclude financial firms in that they were different in characteristics under regulation. In total we have a decade of 218 qualified IPOs for empirical testing.
According to the concept of ultimate control proposed by La Porta et al. (1999) Other sources to identify the relationship come from company prospectuses and 5 The immediate family of a person refers to his spouse, parents, children, siblings, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sons and daughters-in-law, brothers and sisters-in-law.
annual reports in which the relative associated with top managers, directors, and supervisors are noted. Moreover, the ownership registered under other companies or institutions that in turn controlled by the controlling shareholder are hand collected from the item of "invested business", major shareholders", and "trades with affiliated persons" in company prospectuses or annual reports. We also use the data provided by the Central News Agency to check the interwoven relationship among the controlling shareholders.
Definition of Ownership and Board Composition
Voting Rights and Cash Flow Rights
The voting shareholder's sharing of the profits, dividends and the losses due to agency misconduct. Gomes (2000) shows that the higher ownership concentration can serve as a credible commitment that the controlling owner is willing to build a reputation for not expropriating minority shareholders. Therefore, cash flow rights associate with the controlling shareholder's incentive effect in that his/her interests are well aligned with company's profit. In contrast, the divergence between voting and cash flow rights serves the proxy that the controlling owner has high motive to extract wealth from the firm since in so doing he/she receives the entire benefit but only bears a fraction of the cost.
Note that there are cases that a private investment company is included on the list of the major shareholders of a listed company, and the family member of the controlling shareholder represents this private investment company in the board of this listed company. We check the status of this private investment company from possible sources, including "The Study of Taiwanese Groupings", company prospectuses, annual reports, and newspaper clippings, and judge if the voting rights of this private investment company belong to the controlling shareholder. In calculating the cash flow rights, we need detailed structure along each layer of ownership. However, when the detailed ownership structure of the private investment company is unavailable, we assume the private investment company is equally invested by the controlling shareholder and his other affiliated companies.
Second Largest Shareholder
The second largest shareholder is the one who is not associated with the largest shareholder or his affiliated persons or institutions. The existence of the second blockholder facilitates corporate governance as it allows him/her to exert greater influence on the management and to guard off the not profit-maximizing behavior of the controlling shareholders. We assign the dummy of the second largest shareholder the value of 1 when the second largest shareholder holds 5% or more 6 shareholding of the company, and 0 otherwise. In Taiwan, the second largest shareholder tends to be the second largest family, insurance company, government, or other institutional investor.
Board Composition
In the aspect of board composition, we mainly focus on the proportion the 
IPO Price Multiples and Initial Return
According to Kim and Ritter (1999) and Purnanndam and Swaminathan (2002) we use the comparable firm multiples to evaluate the IPO firms. We examine whether the valuation of IPOs is related to corporate governance. We value IPOs using price multiples, such as price-to-book, price-to-sales, and price-to-EBITDA 7 .
These multiples are then compared to or divided by the corresponding multiples of the matching sample, which is selected to fit the following conditions: the same industry code, equivalent in assets value, similar product line, publicly listed for more than one year, and no issuance of new shares in two months. These multiples of IPOs deflated by peers' multiples serve as the dependent variables of the regressions that examine the influence of corporate governance on IPOs pricing. Note that we calculate the matching firms' the price multiples both for one-year and three-year averages prior to IPOs and conclude a similar result. To be concise we only report the results of the latter.
The underpricing of an IPO is defined as the difference between the price on the first trading day and the offer price divided by the offer price. However, the enacted price limit in Taiwan stock market deters market information to fully reflect on price,
we redefine the underpricing (or initial return) of an IPO as the difference between the price on the first day that the price is not closed at the limit and the offer price divided by the offer price. In order to circumvent the impact of market condition, we also calculate the adjusted initial return that subtracts the corresponding market return from the IPO initial return.
IPO Firms Characteristics
Underwriting Variables
In this study we control the underwriting variables in the investigation of corporate governance on IPO valuation. These variables include issuing proceeds, the reputation of accountancy, the reputation of underwriter, and average odds rate of the fixed price offer. Proceeds is defined as the natural logarithm of the multiplicity of offer price and issuing shares (Ritter, 1991 The odd of lottery is defined as the new issuing shares divided by qualified shares subscribed by investors. More optimistic investors subscribing shares will lead to a lower odd rate of lottery. Therefore, a low rate of lottery signifies investors' optimisms regarding the issuing firm and a strong demand of the new issuing shares.
Company Characteristics
We also control the characteristic variables of the issuing firm. The electronic industry dummy is assigned value 1 when the issuing firm is in the electronic industry with the first two digits of industry code of 23 or 24, and 0 otherwise. The age of firm is controlled in the model and calculated as the time from its foundation to go public. Other related work within the IPO of common stock literature that examines the effect of underwriter reputation on initial performance of IPOs sees Logue (1973) , Beatty and Ritter (1986) , Titman and Trueman (1986) , and Maksimovic and Unal (1993) . Loughran and Ritter (2001) report that the median age of firms going public has been remarkably stable at about 7 years old since 1980 with the exception of internet bubble period. The third control variable is the natural logarithm of asset size of issuing firm at the yearend prior to IPO. Debt ratio is defined as the total debt divided by total assets at the yearend prior to IPO. We also use the five-year average return on asset (ROA) prior to IPO to measure the profitability of the issuing firm, and five-year average of the sum of R&D expenditure and advertisement expenses divided by sales to serve as the proxy variable of the issuing firm's growth potential. Finally, the five-year standard deviation of EBIT prior to IPO is used to measure the volatility of issuing firm, with greater of this measure investors tend to discount firm's value. were electronic firms. The median age of 10 years is older than that of 7 years reported by Loughran and Ritter (2001) . Note that the standard deviation of EBIT five years prior to IPOs was 162.35%, indicating that these IPO firms were highly volatile. The total cash flow rights are equal to the sum of all cash flow rights from all ownership chains. The second-largest-shareholder dummy is assigned the value of 1 when there exists the second largest shareholder holding 5% or more shareholding, and 0 otherwise. The pyramidal dummy is assigned the value of 1 when controlling shareholder obtains indirect voting via pyramidal structure, and 0 otherwise. The cross-shareholding dummy is assigned the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder obtains indirect voting via cross shareholding, and 0 otherwise. The price multiples are the offering price divided by book value per share, sales per share, and EBITDA per share prior to IPO. These multiples are then deflated by corresponding multiples of matching firms. Initial return is defined the difference between the first trading day that is not closed at price limit and offer price divided by offer price. The adjusted initial return subtracts the corresponding market return from the initial return. Proceeds is defined as the multiplication of issuing shares and offer price. The accountancy dummy is assigned the value 1 when the associating accounting firm of IPO is in the top six accounting firms, and 0 otherwise. 
Empirical Results
. Basic Statistics
. Corporate Governance and IPO Price Multiples
Follow the notion of Purnanandam and Swaminathan (2002), we calculate the price multiples with respect to book value, sales, and earning before interest and taxes after depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) at per-share basis three years prior to IPOs, respectively. These multiples are then divided by the corresponding multiples of the matching sample in the same industry and close in characteristics. These comparable price multiples are then regressed on corporate governance variables and other controlled variables. Results are summarized in Table 2 , 3, and 4, respectively.
The results show that both the controlling shareholder's cash flow rights and the proportion of his/her cash flow rights to voting rights are positively correlated with the comparable price-to-book multiple of IPO firms at 5% significance level. The positive interest-alignment argument is still sustainable when the dependent variable is replaced by the comparable price-to-sale multiple in Table 3 or by the comparable price-to-EBIDA multiples in Table 4 According to hypothesis 3 we argue that a divergent voting-cash ownership structure is negatively correlated with the comparable price multiples in that the controlling shareholder bearing only small portion of underpricing cost will not be as insistent as when he/she invests high cash flow rights and underwriter assuming the risk of unfavorable market response upon the issuing shares would haggle over the offering price. The informativeness argument also predict a negative relationship between a divergent voting-cash structure and comparable price multiple in that the controlling owner is perceived to report accounting information for self-interested purposes, causing the reported accounting information losses creditability to outsiders (Fan and Wong, 2002) . Underwriters standing on behalf of outsiders are reluctant to spare a high offer price. Though the reduced-monitoring hypothesis states that the controlling shareholder entrenching control through cross shareholding or pyramidal ownership structure needs not to concede the price setting, we would believe that he/she will be relatively passive in responding to question from the underwriter.
We find that the voting-cash deviation is less significant when only including the variable in regression while it is negatively corrected with the comparable price-to-book multiple at 5% significance level when additionally including the interaction between the voting-cash deviation and the cash-flow dummy in regression. We argue that the issuing firms with larger proceeds are able to negotiate a higher price multiple with underwriters. In our sampling period firms in the electronic industry are promising and favored by investors, and with which underwriters are easier to induce a buy cascade even at a high level of price multiple.
The other variables are not consistently significant in all tables. For example, the debt ratio is only marginally significant related to price-to-book multiple in table 2.
The free cash flow hypothesis proposed by Jensen (1986) indicates that high level of debt reduces agency costs because the fixed payments of corporate debt force managers to disgorge any free cash flow that may have been misused. High debt levels can act as a form of corporate governance mechanism. Moreover, time from founding to IPO is negatively associated with comparable price-to-sales multiple in This table reports the regression of IPO price-to-book multiple on corporate governance variables prior to IPO. The dependent variable, price-to-book multiple, is deflated by the equivalent multiple of matching sample. The matching sample is selected to fit the following conditions: the same industry code, equivalent in assets value, similar product line, publicly listed for more than one year, and no issuance of new shares in two months. The cash flow rights and voting rights refer to La Porta et al. (1999) and Calessens et al. (2000) . The cash-flow-rights dummy is assigned the value of 1 when the controlling shareholder's cash flow rights exceed the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The accountancy dummy is assigned the value of 1 when the signing accountant belongs to the top six accounting houses, and 0 otherwise. The underwriter dummy is assigned the value of 1 when the lead underwriter belongs to the top six renowned investment banks, and 0 otherwise. The electronic-industry dummy is assigned the value of 1 when the IPO firm is classified in the industry code of 23 and 24, and 0 otherwise. In each cell the regression coefficient is reported in the upper case and t-statistics in parentheses is reported in the lower case. ***, **, and * represent significance level of 1%,5%, and 10%, respectively. 
. Corporate Governance and Initial Return
There is extensive evidence on the IPO underpricing phenomenon in many developed and emerging markets with new issues tending to exhibit first day returns.
A plethora of theories try to explain the underpricing phenomena. In this section we would investigate whether the corporate governance variables still dictate the initial return of an IPO after the addition of outsiders to the settled negotiation between the issuing firm and underwriter.
From the perspective of interest-alignment hypothesis, the credence of the issuing firms is discounted by outsiders when the controlling shareholder has low degree of cash flow rights, significantly deviates his voting from cash flow rights, or predominates his/her control over the membership of the board of directors and supervisors. Note that the reduced-monitoring hypothesis predicts that the issuing shares of firms whose controlling shareholders having high cash flow rights are less likely to create a buying cascade and thus a higher initial return given that underpricing was not used in the first place for entrenching control of insiders. This prediction is contradictory to that from the interest-alignment hypothesis. We also find that that the reputation dummy of lead underwriter is positively related to initial return. The IPO firms associated with top six underwriters will have a higher initial return by 8%-9%, reflecting the reputation value of prestigious underwriters in ameliorating the extent of information asymmetry between issuer and investors. Booth and Smith (1986) show that an underwriter's reputation serves as a signal for investors that the security's price is accurate. Any misjudgment of the true equilibrium price, either too high or too low, will diminish the underwriter's reputation capital. Carter and Manaster (1990) find that the prestige of an underwriter with his name printed in the tombstone security offering advertisement can explain IPO returns well. Prestigious underwriters are associated with lower risk offerings and better-governed firms. Moreover, the odds of lottery representing market demand of the issuing shares are negatively related to initial return at 1% significance level. The adjusted return is defined that the market return is subtracted from the initial return of IPO. Other independent variables are defined in Table 2 . In each cell the regression coefficient is reported in the upper case and t-statistics in parentheses is reported in the lower case. ***, **, and * represent significance level of 1%,5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Independent
Conclusion
Going public is the first and important decision in the firm's history. A sound corporate governance structure is aimed to harmonize the possible conflicts from managers, majority shareholders, and minority shareholders. In this study we find that corporate governance variables have stronger explanatory power upon the comparable price multiples than upon initial returns of IPO firms. With high cash flow investment in the issuing firms, the controlling shareholders have a strong motive to ask high comparable price multiples. This proposal is also acceptable to the underwriter who believes that the controlling shareholders will have the firms run properly for their own sake. On the contrary, a deviating ownership structure that the controlling shareholder levers control through cross shareholding or pyramidal structure is negative correlated to comparable price multiples. The negotiation of the offering price is strictly dictated by the soundness of corporate governance structure of the IPO firm. Our empirical results from 218 Taiwanese IPO firms for a decade are generally consistent with the positive incentive effect and negative entrenchment effect. The reduced-monitoring hypothesis proposed by Brennan and Franks (1997) and the informativeness hypothesis proposed by Fan and Wong (2002) are also included in analysis that further facilitates the explanations of the empirical results.
Our findings are robust after the control of gross proceeds, the reputation of underwriter and accountant, odds of lottery, industry, age, leverage, and growth potentials.
The major contribution of this paper is to synthesize different perspectives regarding the relationship between ownership structure and price setting and between ownership structure and initial returns. We deem the outcome is the result of repetitive negotiations that involve different interest parties, namely the controlling shareholder of issuing firm, underwriter, and outside investors. Corporate governance variables serve the nexus that integrates the underlying hypotheses in illustration of the willingness and motivation of the controlling shareholder, the acceptance and allowance of the underwriter, and the informativeness of the provided accounting data.
Further research could explore whether corporate governance variables consisting of the superstructure of an issuing firm is comparatively stable overtime and predictive of the firm's future prospect. This could provide additional illustrations beyond the illustrated hypotheses in this study. Moreover, the informativeness hypothesis could be further decomposed into content of information and accessibility of information.
The former is well illustrated in Fan and Wong (2002) and is mainly supported in our empirical findings. However, the latter portraying that the more accessible information such as the composition of board membership should have higher explanatory power upon the outcomes of offer price and initial returns is not fully supported in this study. Further research could refine and explore this argument.
